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BRIAN SLATTERY

The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights In
Canada

Most countries have a national myth-an account that purports to
relate the central events of a country's history in compressed form,
that explains how the country has come to be and what it stands
for. National myths are useful and perhaps indispensable ways of
making the complex past relevant to the perplexing present. They
provide the framework for much historical writing, and subtly
influence lawyers and judges on constitutional issues. All national
myths involve a certain amount of distortion. But some at least
have the virtue of broad historical accuracy, roughly depicting the
major forces at work. The myth that underlies much legal thinking
about the history of Canada lacks that redeeming feature.
It is commonly assumed that North America was juridically a
vacant land when first encountered by Europeans. Bit by bit, lands
were wrested from the wilderness and settled or exploited under
grants from a European monarch, who had obtained complete
sovereignty and title to the soil upon discovery. All land rights in

Canada, other than prescriptive rights, stem directly or indirectly
from Crown grants. Our laws, legal institutions, and constitutional
arrangements all derive from Europe or were created by European
settlers. Our law-making bodies ultimately owe their authority to
the British Parliament or the British Crown. There are, in a word, no
truly indigenous laws, rights, legislatures, or courts in Canada.
This account has marked shortcomings. North America was not,
of

course,

uninhabited

when first explored

and

settled by

Europeans. It was the domain of a variety of independent peoples,
who possessed their own territories, laws, and governmental
institutions.1 These groups often had significant military capabilities,
sufficient to make them respected and feared by the settler
communities and their parent states. Native Americans were jealous
of their independence and quick to avenge intrusions on their lands
and offenses against their persons. Unless the aboriginal peoples
could be conquered, a hazardous enterprise at best, their cooperation
and consent were necessary for sufficient lands to be obtained for
white settlement and held in safety. But Indian nations2 were not
viewed simply as obstacles to European penetration. During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in particular, they were valued
as trading partners and also as military allies in struggles with rival
Christian powers.

European imperial efforts in America usually proceeded on at
least two levels simultaneously. At one level, European states
grappled among themselves for exclusive access to the advantages
offered by the New World, be these precious minerals, skins and furs,
fish, timber, or land for settlement. In the effort to improve their
position relative to one another, the colonial powers at times advanced
extraordinary claims, and sought to justify them by resort to
extraordinary principles. At various points, Papal Bulls, early
discoveries or explorations,
settlements were

invoked

symbolic
by

acts, or feeble

European

nations

to

coastal
support

pretensions to vast territories they neither occupied nor controlled.
These claims had little foundation in either fact or reason, and
usually met with the scorn of competing European powers, even if
the same powers on occasion indulged in similar diplomatic fantasies.
As Elizabeth I of England

tartly

observed to the

Spanish

Ambassador: to sail to and fro, to build huts, to name a river or a
promontory could not confer ownership, since prescription without
possession was of no effect.3 All that mattered in the final analysis
was what a state could gain and hold by force, or coerce its rivals
to recognize in a treaty settlement.4
At another level, European states had to deal with the various
native peoples who were the real masters of North America. France

and England might sign a treaty whereby the lands around Hudson
Bay would be left to the British Crown, but this document was of
little assistance when it came to influencing, much less controlling,
the aboriginal inhabitants.5 The imperial powers were thus obliged to
maintain extensive sets of diplomatic relations with native American
peoples, to enter into alliances, sign treaties, and exchange gifts.6
Incoming Europeans often did their best to secure some authority
over the indigenous groups they dealt with. However, frequently
they were in no position to do this, and it was some time before
the situation changed.
Interesting complications resulted from the coexistence and
interaction of these two diplomatic spheres. The tendency of
many commentators has been to wish the complexities away by
focusing on one sphere (usually the inter-European) to the
exclusion of the other. This blessedly uncomplicated view can no
longer be sustained. Yet if the historical role of native peoples is
now widely recognized, it has not yet been accommodated by the
standard intellectual framework that influences legal thinking. What
we lack is a proper understanding of when and how the native
peoples of Canada were won to the allegiance of the Crown, and
what effect this process had on their original land rights, customary
laws, and systems of government. Did the Crown gain sovereignty

over Canada with or without the consent of the aboriginal peoples,
and on what terms was it achieved? Did native groups come to
occupy the same status as other Canadian subjects, or did they hold
some special relationship with the Crown? It is a remarkable fact
that coherent answers to these questions cannot be found in
standard treatises on Canadian constitutional law and history, or
even in more specialized works.
The Constitution Act, 1982 invites us to remedy this deficiency.7
Sec. 35 provides:
(1) The existing aboriginal

and treaty rights of the

aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes
the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.
This section has a curious past. It was not found in the original
draft of the Act, but was inserted, in a slightly different form, upon
the unanimous recommendation of the Parliamentary Special Joint
Committee on the Constitution after strong representations from native
organizations. The government's decision to include the section was
treated by all parties as an historic occasion and given wide publicity.
So, when the section was later dropped from the draft as the result of
the federal-provincial agreement of November 1981, there was a sharp

reaction among both native and non-native Canadians. Intensive
lobbying and public demonstrations led to the section's reinstatement
with one change: the word "existing" was added to the phrase
"aboriginal and treaty rights."8 In announcing the new version, the
Minister of Justice assured the House of Commons

that

the

amendment did not alter the substance of the provision.9
Sec. 35 has undergone further discussion since the enactment of
the Constitution Act, 1982. Sec. 37 of the Act required that a
constitutional conference be called within one year to deal with
matters concerning the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the
identification and definition of their rights, and stipulated that
representatives of aboriginal Canadians be invited to participate. In
March 1983, the

First

Ministers'

Conference

on

Aboriginal

Constitutional Matters met at Ottawa, attended by the Prime Minister
of Canada, the provincial Premiers or their delegates, territorial
representatives and

representatives from

four

national

native

organizations. The Conference agreed, in an accord dated 16 March,
to make certain changes in the existing provisions, and to meet
again within one year.10 Resolutions to effect the proposed changes
are now being considered by Parliament and the provincial
legislatures, and it seems likely the amending process will be
successful. So here I will discuss the constitutional provisions in their

amended form.
Under the 16 March agreement, two further subsections will be
added to sec. 35.11 The first serves to remove doubts as to whether the
phrase ''treaty rights" in sec. 35(1) covers rights gained under nowexisting and future land claims agreements, a number of which have
recently been concluded with native peoples or are in the process of
being negotiated. 12 The second specifies that the aboriginal and treaty
rights referred to in sec. 35(1) are guaranteed equally to male and
female persons, thus ensuring sexual equality in access to these
13

rights. The recent agreement also proposes to add a new sec. 35.1,
requiring that any future amendments to the major constitutional
provisions regarding aboriginal peoples will first be discussed at a
Conference of First Ministers to which aboriginal representatives will
be invited.
These sections make up Part Il of the Constitution Act, 1982,
entitled "Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada." They fall
outside the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, found in Part I
of the Act. They are supplemented by a provision located within the
Charter proper that serves to shield native rights from the possible
adverse effects of other Charter provisions. Sec. 25 states:
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or

derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada
including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized

by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the

original peoples of Canada by way of land claims
settlement.
The 16 March agreement changes the wording in para. (b) of sec. 25 so
as to indicate that both past and future land claims agreements are
covered.14 The agreement also adds a new sec. 37.1 requiring that two
further First Ministers' Conferences be convened before April 1987 to
discuss aboriginal constitutional matters.

The most important of these various provisions is that found
in sec. 35(1), which states that the existing aboriginal and treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed. I will focus exclusively on this provision here,
leaving aside a range of issues relating to its companion
sections.15 It will be helpful first to identify the two groups of
rights referred to, namely
"aboriginal" and "treaty" rights, before considering the precise scope
and effect of the provision.

ABORIGINAL RIGHTS

Sec. 35(1) adopts and confirms the common law doctrine of
aboriginal rights. 16

This doctrine holds

that the Crown's

acquisition of North American territories was governed by a
principle of continuity, whereby the property rights, customary
laws, and governmental institutions of the native peoples were
presumed to survive, so far as this result was compatible with the
Crown's ultimate title, and subject to lawful dispositions to the
contrary. Aboriginal groups presumptively assumed the status of
domestic dependent nations united by special ties to the crown as
ultimate sovereign. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated this
doctrine in the early cases of Johnson v. M'lntosh (1823)17 and
Worcester v. Georgia (1832).18 It has figured prominently in a
number of Canadian decisions over the years, and was recently
reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. A.G. of British
Columbia (1973).19

The Quebec case of Connolly v. Woolrich (1867) 20 provides an
interesting example of the doctrine's operation. There the courts
upheld a marriage contracted under Cree customary law between a
white man and an Indian woman in the Canadian North-West, even
though the same man later married another woman in a Christian
ceremony recognized by Quebec law. In attempting to discredit the

first marriage, the second wife argued, among other things, that
English common law had been introduced into the North-West
before the marriage took place, thus invalidating Indian custom. In
any case, she said, the marriage customs of pagan and uncivilized
nations such as the Crees could not be recognized even between the
natives themselves, much less between a Christian and a native.
These arguments did not persuade the courts. The trial judge noted
that the first English and French settlers in the North-West found
the country in the possession of numerous and powerful Indian
tribes. Even if the settlers brought with them the laws of their
mother countries, yet, will it be contended that the territorial rights,
political organization such as it was, or the laws and usages of the
Indian tribes, were abrogated-that they ceased to exist when these
two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal occupants?
In my opinion, it is beyond controversy that they did not-that so
far from being abolished, they were left in full force, and were not
even modified in the slightest degree in regard to the civil rights of
the natives.21
The doctrine of aboriginal rights draws on two main sources,
namely French22 and English23 state practice regarding Indian
nations from early colonial times, and the Royal Proclamation of
1763. The first subject cannot be pursued here. The second, however,

deserves more than a passing mention, because it provides essential
background for an understanding of sec. 35(1).

The Royal Proclamation of 176324

By 1763, Great Britain's long struggle with France for American
empire was over. At the Peace of Paris, France ceded all its remaining
territories in Canada to the British Crown, as well as its territories east
of the Mississippi River. Britain also obtained Florida from the Spanish
Crown, thus completing its claims to the eastern and northern sectors of
America.25 Only one area was left to another
European power, namely the lands west of the Mississippi that
France had relinquished to Spain the previous year.26
These treaties temporarily sorted out the claims of the three
main European rivals among themselves. But the French Crown
could not give Great Britain what it did not possess itself, namely
authority over the native groups inhabiting the ceded territories.
These nations were, in many cases, trading partners of the French
and sometime military allies. If they were not prepared to accept
direct French authority, neither were they willing to accept that
France might deposit them in the pocket of the English King.
As the Chippewa leader, Minivavana, told an English trader:
Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you
have not yet conquered us. We are not your slaves. These

lakes, these woods and mountains, were left to u.s by our
ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with
them to none.27
A similar viewpoint was expressed by certain Wabash River
Indians:
you tell us, that when you Conquered the French, they gave
you·this Country. That no difference may happen hereafter,
we tell you now the French never conquered, neither did
they purchase a foot of our Country, nor have [they a right] to
give it to you, we gave them liberty to settle for which they
always rewarded us and treated us with great Civility.28
Britain was well aware in 1763 of the precarious nature of its
relations with the old Indian allies of France, and the growing
dissatisfaction of its own native allies and trading partners. Since
midcentury, the British government had been increasingly occupied
with Indian affairs, and the war with France had emphasized the
importance of native friendship and support. For some time, a plan
had been afoot to assure the Indians of the Crown's good intentions
by removing a principal cause of Indian discontent-white intrusion
on Indian lands. This plan culminated in the publication of a Royal
Proclamation on 7 October 1763.29 The interest of the document is
not purely historical, for its main terms have never been generally

repealed in Canada.30 Although it must be read in the light of later
developments, it still forms a principal basis for aboriginal land
claims in many areas.
The Proclamation is one of those legal instruments that does
simple things in complicated ways. The central idea of its Indian
provisions is very simple: to ensure that no Indian lands in America
are taken by British subjects without native consent. This objective is
secured

by

three

main

measures:

colonial

governments are

forbidden to grant any unceded Indian lands, British subjects to
settle on them, and private individuals to purchase them, with a
system of public purchases adopted as the official mode of
extinguishing Indian title. The British government was particularly
concerned

at

indiscriminately

the
into

prospect
the

of

white

American

settlement

interior,

and

spreading
so

the

Proclamation temporarily seals off much of that area to settlers,
designating it an exclusive Indian territory. But the document's
main measures are not confined to the Indian Territory; they
apply throughout British North America.
The Indian provisions of the Proclamation begin with a preamble,
where the King explains his basic aims:

And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our
Interest and the Security of Our Colonies, that the several
Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected,

and who live under Our Protection, should not be molested
or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our
Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to,
or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them,
as their Hunting Grounds; . . .
While the King asserts ultimate sovereignty over the Indians,
he also acknowledges their semi-autonomous status, describing
them as Nations or Tribes ''with whom We are connected, and
who live under Our Protection." He recognizes that the Indians
are entitled to undisturbed possession of the lands reserved to
them, and, in an important formula repeated later in the text,
defines these reserves as any Indian lands that have not been
ceded to or purchased by the Crown. The King claims these lands
as part of his dominions, but at the same time recognizes the
existence of an Indian interest requiring extinguishment by
cession or purchase. In technical terms, the Indian interest
constitutes a legal burden on the Crown's ultimate title until
surrendered.
In 1763, most of the American territories claimed by Britain
were

unceded

lands

held

by

native

peoples. Under

the

Proclamation, such lands were automatically deemed Indian
reserves. Their boundaries were determined negatively by past

Indian cessions and positively by current Indian possessions.
Much of the unorganized American interior was still, of course,
unceded. But other unceded lands lay within the undisputed
boundaries of existing colonies, including the northern colonies of
Rupert's Land, Quebec, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, now
forming part of Canada.
It is sometimes argued that the Proclamation recognized

aboriginal land rights only in the exclusive Indian Territory
created in the American hinterland.31 On this supposition, Indian
title was not recognized in areas specifically excluded from the
Territory, such as the coastal belt east of the Appalachian
Mountains, and the colonies of Quebec and Rupert's Land.32 But
the text does not support this view. After describing the boundaries
of the tenitory, the Proclamation orders the removal of all pers9ns
who have settled either within the tenitory "or upon any other
Lands, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are
still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid" (emphasis added).
This provision clearly assumes that unceded Indian lands located
outside the Indian Tenitory are reserved for Indian use. The King
also forbids colonial Governors to make grants of "any Lands
whatever, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us as
aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them." The ban

applies to unceded Indian lands generally, wherever they happen to be
located. Finally, the Proclamation provides that no private person
shall make any purchases from the Indians "of any Lands reserved to
the said Indians, within those Parts of Our Colonies where We have
thought proper to allow Settlement," and specifies that if the
Indians are ever inclined to dispose of such lands, they shall be
purchased for the Crown in a public assembly. Since the provision
only applies in areas where settlement was permitted, and the Indian
Territory was, for the time being, expressly closed to "any Purchases
or Settlements whatever," it could only refer to unceded Indian
lands found outside the Territory, in eastern and northern colonies
where settlement was still allowed.
In brief, the Proclamation recognized that lands possessed by
Indians throughout British territories in ·America were reserved for
their exclusive use, unless previously ceded to the Crown. Prior to a
public cession of such lands, they could not be granted away or
settled. These provisions applied not only to the Indian Territory,
but to the full range of British colonies in North America, no matter
how humble or peripheral. In this respect, Rupert's Land, Quebec,
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, the Thirteen Colonies, and the Floridas
were brought under a uniform legal regime.33 The Indian Territory
was placed in a special position. Whereas in other areas Indian

lands might still be purchased by public authorities, in the territory
such purchases were forbidden altogether for the time being. The
idea was to divert the flow of white settlement from the American
interior to the northern and southern colonies, which were still
relatively sparsely settled. However, the Crown envisaged that in
due course parts of the Territory might be opened up, in which
case the standard regime governing purchase of Indian lands
would take effect.
There has been some controversy whether the Proclamation
applied to the far western reaches of the American continent,
notably modern British Columbia and the Yukon Territory.34 The
question has usually been treated as depending on how much
territory Great Britain claimed in 1763. Here, the historical
evidence indicates that British claims extended indefinitely
westward to the Pacific Ocean in latitudes now occupied by
Canada.35 But a better basis exists for resolving the issue. Many of
the Proclamation's provisions are framed in general terms,
referring broadly to "Our Dominions and Territories" and "Our
Colonies or Plantations in America." Imperial enactments using
such terms were normally given a prospective application, so as to
apply not only to colonies and territories held when the
legislation was enacted but also to those acquired subsequently,

unless this result was clearly excluded. The purpose of the
Proclamation was to supply a uniform set of rules governing
Indian lands throughout British territories in North America.
There is o reason to think that Indian lands located in territories
acquired after 1763 needed less protection than those acquired
earlier. It is natural to infer that the Proclamation applied to both.36
The Proclamation of 1763 has a profound significance for
modern Canada.

Under its terms, aboriginal peoples held

continuing rights to their lands except where these rights have
been extinguished by voluntary cession. Treaties of cession have
been signed for large parts of Canada, notably in Ontario and the
Prairie Provinces. But no such treaties exist for the Atlantic
Provinces, and parts of Quebec, British Columbia, the Yukon, and
the Northwest Territories, as well for pockets of land elsewhere.
Moreover, there is doubt whether Canadian legislatures were
competent to override the Proclamation's terms prior to 1931, when
the Statute of Westminster was enacted.37 So native peoples may
today hold subsisting aboriginal rights to large tracts of Canadian
land.

The Adaptability of Aboriginal Rights

As noted earlier, the doctrine of aboriginal rights extends not
only to property rights but also to customary laws and governmental

institutions. It is important

to

understand

that

the

internal

development of such rights was not arrested at the time the Crown
acquired sovereignty. Rather, these rights retained a certain amount of
inherent flexibility, allowing for adaption to new circumstances. So,
for example, the customs of a native group were not permanently
frozen at the time the Crown first asserted sovereignty, in 1670, or
1763, or at some other date. They remained responsive to changes in
group behavior and attitudes. Likewise, the right of self-government
was not tied down to institutions and arrangements prevailing at
some distant historical period. In principle, a native group remained
free to adopt new governmental structures.
The position of aboriginal land rights is more complex. As we
have seen, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 laid down a uniform legal
regime governing native title, whereby native groups were recognized as
holding communal rights to their unceded lands, subject only to a
restriction of alienation. The same position has been held to obtain in
common law. At the communal level, the title was a uniform one, not
varying in character from group to group or affected by local native
custom. It was the same for a nation of farmers as for a band of
hunters. In all cases, it allowed for full possession and use of the land.
But within a group, the extent to which a particular sub-group, family,
or individual might take advantage of the group's collective title was

determined by rules particular to the group itself, as dictated by
customary law and group organs of self-government. In a nutshell, the
rights of the group as against the Crown and other outsiders were
governed by uniform rules flowing from the Proclamation and the
common law, while the rights of group members inter se were
governed by rules peculiar to the individual group. The latter could be
altered in the same manner as other group customs, by a general
change in attitude and practice, or deliberate amendment by competent
bodies.
Aboriginal title imported full rights of possession and use.
Native groups were not confined in law to any particular mode of
land use, much less to ''traditional" uses. An Indian band that
originally lived by hunting or fishing might turn to farming when
wild game became depleted, or to ranching, lumbering or mining. To
hold that native peoples were permanently wedded to certain
historical practices would in some cases have been to sentence them
to slow starvation; in any case, it would have denied them the right
to adapt to new conditions or exploit their lands more productively.
The Proclamation did not establish any boundaries between
native groups. In practice, such boundaries tended to fluctuate in
response to demographic, economic, or military pressures. It could
hardly be held that an Indian band that migrated in search of better

hunting conditions or security from its enemies forfeited any claim to
aboriginal title. So, it was recognized that native peoples were
entitled to the unceded lands they actually possessed at any given
period. When the Crown wanted to negotiate the sU1Tender of
certain lands, it dealt with the people actually controlling them. There
was usually no inquiry whether the people had been there from
"time immemorial" or the date the Crown first claimed sovereignty.
Such an approach would have quickly proved unworkable. Of course,
once native lands had been validly ceded by a group holding title to
them, they were permanently withdrawn from the pool of lands
available for aboriginal possession.

Indian Treaties

As we have seen, many of the native peoples inhabiting the
territories claimed by Great Britain in 1763 were in fact independent;
at best they were allies and trading partners of the Crown, at worst
declared enemies. In areas remote from the eastern colonies, there
were numerous groups that had little if anything to do with the British
at all.
The Crown thus faced the task of consolidating its territorial
claims by slowly earning the allegiance of the native inhabitants.
From time to time, it also needed to obtain Indian lands for
settlement, and here the Royal Proclamation required a voluntary

public cession. The practice of making treaties with the Indians was
well adapted to both purposes. It was followed in many British
colonies up to Canadian Confederation in 1867, and continued by the
Federal government for many years after that date.38 Indeed, treaties
with native peoples have recently been revived in the shape of land
claims agreements.39
Indian treaties have taken many forms over the years. Some
treaties, usually concluded during the early stages of European
contact, were drafted as international pacts, whereby a European
state negotiated on equal terms with an Indian group regarding such
matters

as

peace,

friendship,

trade,

and

alliance.40 Other

agreements, which became more common as European states
gained the upper hand, defined the relationship between the
Crown and what was described as a dependent, protected, or
tributary aboriginal nation, one that in some respects owed
allegiance

to

the

Crown,

but

in other respects remained

autonomous.41 Another variety of agreement was more on the
style of a voluntary submission, in which the members of an
Indian group acknowledged their subordination to the Crown and
undertook to behave as good and faithful subjects, in return for the
Crown's protection and other advantages.42 These types of
agreements all had international or broadly constitutional aspects.

Others were more mundane. The most common was a simple
cession of Indian land to the Crown in return for stated
consideration, with no attempt to define the overall position of the
Indian signatories vis-a-vis the Crown.43
Many historical agreements were a mixture of types. An
example is provided by Treaty Number Three, known as the
North-West Angle Treaty, signed in 1873 between the Crown and
the Saulteaux Tribe of Ojibway Indians, inhabiting an area now
straddling the border of Ontario and Manitoba.44 The Treaty
served a number of goals, broadly described in the opening
paragraphs as obtaining the Indians' consent to the settlement of
their country, and establishing peace and goodwill between them
and the Crown. The initial clauses refer to the Indians as
subjects of the Queen. But subsequent provisions make it clear
that one function of the Treaty is in fact to secure the Indians'
formal adherence to the Queen as sovereign. Thus, the Indians
promise to conduct themselves as good and loyal subjects of Her
Majesty, to obey the law, to maintain peace with both whites and
Indians, to refrain from molesting the persons or property of other
inhabitants, and to help apprehend any Indians infringing the law or the
Treaty provisions.
These were not mere pro forma undertakings. The independent
attitude of the Indians is illustrated by the statement of their spokeman,

Mawedopenais, during negotiations with Crown officials:
We think it a great thing to meet you here. What we have heard
yesterday, and as you represented yourself, you said the Queen
sent you here, the way we understood you as a representative
of the Queen. All this is our property where you have come. . .
. This is what we think, that the Great Spirit has planted us on
this ground where we are, as you were where you came from.
We think where we are is our property. I will tell you what he
said to us when he planted us here; the rules that we should
follow us Indians He has given us rules that we should follow
to govern us rightly.45

This statement suggests that, from the Indians' perspective, they
negotiated the Treaty as autonomous peoples, with their own
countries and laws. The undertakings made in the Treaty to
adhere to the Queen and her laws represent an important
voluntary alteration in their status, if in reality those terms were
fully explained to the Indian parties and accepted by them.
The Indians also cede to the Crown "all their rights, titles and
privileges" to a defined tract of land. In return, the Crown
undertakes to set aside certain lands as Indian reserves, to make
annual payments to the Indians, to maintain schools on the
reserves, to furnish annual supplies of ammunition and twine, and
to bestow other specified benefits. In a clause of great practical

significance to the Indians, the Crown also agrees that they shall
continue to have the right to hunt and fish throughout the lands
surrendered, subject to any regulations made by the Government
of Canada, and excepting any lands to be taken up for settlement,
mining, lumbering, or other purposes.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE

We are now better equipped to interpret sec. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The section states that "the existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed." A number of difficult questions
arise regarding the scope and effect of the provision. These
depend in part on the meaning of the word "existing." It can be
argued that the word has three distinct effects. First, it restricts
sec. 35(1) to rights in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982
came into force, and so excludes rights arising after that date.
Second, it ensures that the section only covers rights that already
existed under common law, statute, or other legal instrument. Third,
it preserves the existing subordination of aboriginal and treaty rights
to statute, and prevents the Constitution Act, 1982 from entrenching
them. I will consider these arguments separately.

The Time of Recognition

Does sec. 35(1) apply to any aboriginal or treaty rights that happen
to exist from time to time, or is it confined to those existing on the
date the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force, on what I shall call
the "commencement date"? In other words, does the section establish
''floating" categories that attach to any rights meeting the section's
description regardless of when they arise, or does it establish "fixed"
categories covering a finite body of rights identifiable on the
commencement date? On the first view, rights under a treaty signed
in 1990 would benefit, while on the second view they would not.
A standard rule of statutory interpretation provides that the law is
always speaking and applies to new facts as they arise.46 But this
presumption can be overturned by the statute's wording, and arguably
the word "existing" has that effect here. Turning to judicial decisions,
we find that "existing" has sometimes been held to have a
prospective application, but in other cases to mean "existing at the
time of enactment," depending on the context.47 The question comes
down to what sec. 35(1) intends to say.
Several factors can be cited in favor of the view that the section
refers only to rights identifiable on the commencement date. There is
a notable difference in phraseology between sec. 35(1) and the
protective provision found in sec. 25 of the Charter.48 The latter

refers to "any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada," and does not use
the qualifier "existing." The presence of that word in sec. 35(1)
arguably intimates that a narrower range of rights is singled out
for positive recognition,

namely

those

identifiable

on the

commencement date. This conclusion is bolstered perhaps by the
statement that the rights in question "are hereby recognized and
affirmed." The wording suggests a discrete act of recognition,
pinpointed in time, rather than a continuing process of recognition.
The inference seems stronger, however, in the English version
than in the French, where no equivalent for "hereby" appears.49
Standing alone, then, sec. 35(1) might well be interpreted as
covering only rights existing on the commencement date. However, this
interpretation cannot easily be sustained in the light of sec. 35(3),
which states:

For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights"
includes rights that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired.
This provision specifies that the word ''treaty" includes land
claims agreements of the modern type. It also indicates that
sec..35(1) covers rights arising from agreements signed after the
commencement date. Rights that "may be . . . acquired" under
land claims agreements are mentioned along with those that

"now exist" a clear reference to rights acquired in future.
Moreover, sec. 35(3) is presented, not as an exception to the
rule laid down in sec. 35(1), but as a clarification of that rule,
enacted only "for greater certainty." If the partial definition of
''treaty rights" given in sec. 35(3) is inserted in sec. 35(1), it
specifies in effect that the expression "existing . . . treaty rights"
includes "existing rights that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired ." This does not make sense
unless the word "existing" means "existing from time to time."
On balance, then, sec. 35(1) is best interpreted as embracing
not only aboriginal and treaty rights that existed on the
commencement date but also those arising later. So, rights
acquired under treaties signed after that date will be covered. A
different sort of effect may occur in the case of aboriginal rights.
The particular form that such rights assume has in principle
always been open to change under the doctrine of aboriginal
rights. We saw, for example, that native customary law and
governmental institutions were not petrified at the moment the
Crown assumed sovereignty, but remained living entities open to
development in accordance with group needs. Likewise, while
aboriginal land title was uniform at the group level, it flowered into
any number of distinct species within native groups, in accordance

with customary law and rules laid down by communal organs. Such
rules were not permanent, but could be altered from time to time.
The enactment of sec. 35(1) did not bring to a sudden halt all
evolutionary processes in these spheres; to the contrary, it
reaffirmed the doctrine allowing for such evolution.
If

lights may be added by treaty to those already covered by

sec. 35(1), it may be inferred that lights covered there may also be
modified

or

extinguished

by

the

same

method,

without

constitutional amendment. As we will see later, the wording of sec.
35(3) strongly implies that aboriginal land lights may be exchanged
for treaty lights through land claims agreements.
The general picture that emerges is this. Any aboriginal and
treaty lights that stem from acts or circumstances occuring or
existing prior to the commencement date qualify for coverage in sec.
35(1). These lights may be supplemented by means of voluntary
agreements (''treaties") signed with the Crown after that date. Rights
flowing from such agreements will automatically be captured by sec.
35(1), without need for constitutional amendment. By the same
token, lights covered by the section may be diminished by
agreement. The latter point will receive fuller treatment later. But for
the moment it may be adopted as a working hypothesis.

The Effect of Recognition

A: second effect can arguably be attributed to the wording
"existing." For a light to qualify under sec. 35(1), it must not only be
an "aboriginal" or ''treaty" light within the section's meaning, it
must also have a sound legal basis apart from the Constitution Act,
1982 itself.
The reasoning in support of this conclusion runs as follows. The
section is confined to "existing" lights. But lights are intangibles;
their existence cannot be demonstrated in the same way as teacups
and toadstools. A light "exists" only to the extent that it can be
justified by reference to some sort of normative :framework. The
only framework which qualifies for this role is that provided by
Canadian law. So, for a light to be an "existing light" within the
meaning of sec. 35(1), it must already be recognized in Canadian
law, apart from the Constitution Act, 1982.
This requirement, if correct, has several consequences. Sec. 35(1)
does not bolster the position of lights whose legal status is
otherwise uncertain or defective. Moreover, it cannot heal any
blemishes in the legal rights it covers; it takes them as they are,
warts and all. In short, the section has no remedial effect in respect to
the status or character of the rights it addresses.

However,

this interpretation

is not wholly

convincing.

Consider the position of a right to an annuity held under an Indian
treaty that was signed by the Crown under the royal prerogative but
never

confirmed

by

Parliament.

Arguably,

the

right

is

unenforceable in Canadian law in the absence of Parliamentary
approval.50 Assuming this is correct, does it necessarily follow that
the right is not an "existing treaty right" within the meaning of sec.
35(1)? It would seem more natural to read the section as referring
to rights existing under the terms of the treaty, without reference
to the larger question of their status in Canadian law. On this
view, one effect of the section is in fact to remedy any
imperfections in that status.
So it can· be argued that the word "existing" does not require
that the rights recognized by sec. 35(1) already have a firm basis
in Canadian law. Rather, the phrase "existing aboriginal and
treaty rights" can be interpreted as referring to any rights of that
description that have not previously been extinguished by acts
valid under Canadian law. Which interpretation is right? The
issue turns less on a bald exegesis of the word "existing" than on a
reasonable reading of the provision as a whole. We are drawn
once again to the statement that the rights in question "are hereby
recognized and affirmed." These words express the section's main
purpose

and effect,

and

supply

the

key

to

a

balanced

understanding of its terms.
The phrase "are hereby recognized" can be read in two main
ways: it can mean "are hereby acknowledged to be valid or
genuine,"

or

simply

"are

hereby

accorded

notice

or

consideration."51 If the second construction is correct, then the
Constitution Act, 1982 does no more than "note" the rights in
question, which raises the
question why it bothers to deal with them at all. It seems more
likely that the Act means to acknowledge officially the validity of these
rights. In fact, the first meaning is the ordinary legal one. A widely
used

legal

dictionary

says that

''recognition"

is

equivalent

to

''ratification" and "confirmation."52 And a provision stating that courts
"shall recognize and take notice of all equitable estates, titles, and rights"
has been interpreted judicially as directing courts to give effect to
those rights.53

A similar choice awaits us in interpreting the phrase "are
hereby . . . affirmed." It can mean "are hereby confirmed or
ratified," or alternatively "are hereby strongly asserted."54 Again,
the first sense is the ordinary legal one, as dictionaries testify.55
Black's, for example, says that "affirm" means to ''ratify, make firm,
confirm, establish, reassert," and Jowitt's notes, among other things,
that where a party to a voidable contract waives his right to avoid it he
is said to "affirm" the contract.56 Given the doubts surrounding

aboriginal and treaty rights, it seems likely that the Constitution Act,
1982 uses "affirm" in its normal legal sense of "confirm" or ''ratify."

This conclusion is supported by the French version of sec. 35(1),
which has equal authority with the English. It provides that the
rights in question are "reconnus et confirmes ." Thus, "confirmes" is
presented as the equivalent of "affirmed." The choice of words is
significant. Le Petit Robert tells us that "con.firmer", as used in the
present context, means "to render certain; to affirm . . . the
existence of something."57 Moreover, a standard French-English
dictionary supplies only one English meaning for "con.firmer," namely
"to confirm," and gives as an example the phrase "con.firmer un traite ,"
that is, ''to ratify a treaty."58 It follows that the phrase "are hereby. . .

affirmed" in sec. 35(1) means "are hereby confirmed"; only then does
it have a common core of meaning with the French text.
There are numerous authorities on the juridical meaning of
"confirm." They hold in effect that to confirm something is to
complete or establish what was previously imperfect or uncertain, or
to ratify what was done earlier without authority or insufficiently.59
In particular, it seems that to confirm a document may mean to give

it a life that it otherwise lacked, as when an invalid document is
confirmed by another document.60 In land law, a "confirmation" is
the conveyance of an estate or right in lands or tenements to

someone who already has possession thereof or some estate therein,
whereby avoidable estate is made sure and unavoidable or a
particular estate is increased or enlarged.61
These authorities suggest that sec. 35(1) has a broad remedial
effect. It addresses itself in part to rights that arguably lacked legal
status, or were uncertain or defective in various respects, and
recognizes them as legal rights, and not merely moral or political
rights, or precarious rights dependent on the will of the Sovereign.
It follows that the word "existing" does not confine the section to
rights already recognized at law, or prevent it from remedying
defects in those rights. There would be little point in recognizing and
affirming rights if the effect were restricted in advance to rights
that needed no recognition or affirmation. Rather, the word
"existing" should be read in the second sense considered above, as
meaning "unextinguished" or "subsisting" -thus excluding rights
that

had

been

terminated

by

lawful

acts

prior

to

the

commencement date, but not requiring that any unextinguished
rights have been fully recognized in Canadian law before that date.
One point needs explanation. To say that certain rights are
now confirmed as legal rights, or that defects in their legal
character are cured does not necessarily mean that such rights
are immune to statutory override. It means that they are full-

fledged legal rights, enforceable in the courts, and secure against
possible invasion by executive act under the prerogative. Whether
the Constitution Act, 1982 also shields aboriginal and treaty rights
from statutes is a distinct question, which I shall now consider.

Entrenchment
Aboriginal and treaty rights could in principle be modified by the
acts of a competent legislature before the Constitution Act, 1982 took
effect.62 Has this position now changed? The answer depends in part on
sec. 52(1) of the Act. This states:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions

of the

Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or effect.

The term "Constitution of Canada" is defined in sec. 52(2) as
including the Constitution Act, 1982. Is a law that infringes a right
in sec. 35(1) void for inconsistency with the Constitution of
Canada? It will be simpler, in answering this question, to deal
first with statutes passed after the commencement date, and then
those before that date.

Suppose, in 1990, Parliament enacts a statute expropriating a
tract of aboriginal land covered by sec. 35(1). The Constitution Act,
1982 directs the courts to recognize the aboriginal title in question,

while the statute tells them to disregard it. The courts cannot do
both.

In the

absence

of

any special factors justifying

the

expropriation, as discussed later, the constitutional provision must
take precedence and nullify the conflicting statute.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the word "existing" in sec.
35(1) preserves aboriginal and treaty rights in the state they were in at

the

commencement

date,

which,

in

principle,

included

a

subordination to statute. If a legislature was competent to curtail
aboriginal and treaty rights before the Constitution Act, 1982 took
effect, it is still competent to do so. But we have already seen that
the phrase "are hereby recognized and affirmed" gives the section a
broad remedial effect, disposing of the notion that it preserves the
status quo. Moreover, the argument confuses the section's scope
with its legal effect. The fact that the section only covers "existing"
rights does not necessarily mean that the Act's effect on these
rights is controlled by the law formerly in force.63
Another factor must be considered. Sec. 35(1) can only be
amended in accordance with Part V of the Act. Under the ordinary
procedure, laid down in sec. 38, an amendment requires the approval
of Parliament and of two-thirds of provincial legislatures accounting
for fifty percent of the total population of the provinces. Yet the
argument set out above holds, in effect, that sec. 35(1) could be

eviscerated by an ordinary federal statute stating that ''the existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby extinguished." It seems very unlikely that the amending
formula can be circumvented so easily.
This conclusion is supported by the wording of sec. 35(4). It
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal
and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.
The word "guaranteed" is significant, because it plainly indicates an
intent to entrench. If sec. 35(1) did not guarantee aboriginal and
treaty rights at all, what would be the point of stating that it
guarantees them equally to both sexes?
I conclude, then, that sec. 35(1) entrenches aboriginal and treaty
rights against statutory override.64 But entrenchment does not
completely preclude legal limitation of those rights. In determining
whether a statute infringes a sec. 35(1) right, the courts will have
to define the proper bounds of the right, and here they will be
guided in part by standards of reasonableness. Once, however,
those reasonable bounds have been determined it will not ordinarily
be possible for statutes to overstep them.
The question arises whether this is always true, or whether

there may not be unusual circumstances in which a protected
right, as properly defined, may be overridden by ordinary statute.
Imagine that in wartime a particular tract of land is needed for
defense installations, and for various good reasons no other tract
will do. It happens the land is subject to aboriginal title. May the
federal government expropriate the land by simple statute, or
must

it follow the cumbersome procedure laid

down

for

constitutional amendments? It can be strongly argued that sec.
35(1) is governed by an implicit standard of reasonableness, not
only in its definition of the rights recognized, but also in the
protection it affords to such rights. If this view is correct, then the
government may probably proceed by statute, considering the
urgency of its requirements.
The implicit standard postulated

here is clearly more

demanding than that found in sec. 1of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which provides that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights set out in it "subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." It seems that sec. 35 was placed outside
the Charter precisely to put it beyond the reach of sec. 1. Moreover,
certain aboriginal and treaty rights need special protection because
they are capable of being exhausted. If all aboriginal lands were

taken, aboriginal land rights would, of course, cease to exist. By
contrast, a Charter right such as freedom of speech is capable of
infinite renewal.
These considerations suggest that sec. 35(1) erects a high
barrier against statutory interference, one that can be surmounted
only in emergencies, for pressing public need. So aboriginal and
treaty rights are not, in ordinary circumstances, subject to statutory
expropriation, even if

generous monetary compensation is

provided. What the Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees is the right itself,
not its supposed monetary equivalent. Had the Act contemplated such a
substitution, clear language would have been used.

Prior Statutory Extinguishment

We have been considering laws passed after the commencement
date that violate a sec. 35(1) right. What about laws passed before
that date? We saw earlier that the phrase "existing aboriginal and
treaty rights" does not cover rights extinguished by legislation or
other acts before the commencement date. In principle, then, no
conflict can arise between rights "existing" on that date and acts
passed before then, because the former are defined and limited by
the latter. The real problem is determining whether an act passed
before the commencement date actually extinguished the right in

question.
Treaty rights present particular difficulties. Where, for example, a
statute in force on the commencement date was inconsistent with a
right conferred by a treaty, and the enacting legislature was
competent to modify the treaty, did the treaty right cease to "exist"
for purposes of sec. 35(1)? Suppose a nineteenth century Indian
treaty guarantees an unrestricted right of :fishing in a certain area,
and a federal statute in force on the commencement date restricts
:fishing in that area for all persons, including Indians. Clearly, the
Indians do not have an unrestricted statutory right to fish. But does
their treaty right still exist?
The answer depends on the statute's wording. We must
distinguish between a statute that nullifies a treaty right and one
that merely fails to implement or observe it. The latter would not
relieve the Crown of its obligations under the treaty. Where the
statute's wording does not indicate that the treaty was present to the
mind of Parliament and consciously repudiated, the treaty promise
remains intact, if unfulfilled. Explicit words would seem necessary to
release the Crown from promises made to private parties in return for
substantial benefits gained at those parties' expense. So, where a
statute in force on the commencement date is inconsistent with a
treaty promise, but does not explicitly repudiate it, the Constitution

Act, 1982 arguably affirms the promise and renders the legislation
ineffective to that extent.
The distinction is clear in principle, but not always in practice.
Some Indian treaties expressly say that certain promises are subject to
future governmental regulation. In Treaty Number Three of 1873,
discussed earlier,65 the Queen agrees that the Indian parties shall
have the right to continue hunting and fishing throughout the lands
surrendered in the Treaty, "subject to such regulations as may from
time to time by made by her Government of her Dominion of
Canada," and saving any tracts taken up for settlement or other
purposes. By contrast, certain earlier treaties containing similar
promises make no reference to future governmental regulation.66

If

sec. 35(1) entrenches the actual rights guaranteed in Indian treaties,
what effect does it have on the promise made in Treaty Three?
It could be argued, on the one hand, that the treaty right is
explicitly characterized as subject to governmental regulation; so, the
constitutional entrenchment of the right does not remove its liability to
legislative erosion or extinguishment. On the other hand, it could be
said that the treaty simply makes explicit what would in any case be
understood: rights are subject to Parliamentary regulation unless
specially" entrenched. On this view, since the Constitution Act, 1982
alters the principle of Parliamentary supremacy referred to in the

treaty, it also places the treaty right beyond legislative interference.
The question boils down to the correct interpretation of the
treaty. What does the Crown undertake to do, on a reasonable view of
the written text and related negotiations? In 1873, hunting and
fishing were the mainstay of many Indian groups. It seems unlikely
that the Indians would have agreed that, in return for ceding away
most of their lands, they would receive a right of hunting and fishing
characterized as liable to complete suppression. On the other hand,
the reference to governmental regulation is argt.1ably something
more than the expression of a standard constitutional rule. At least in
the written text, it seems to qualify the scope of the Crown's
undertaking directly.
These reflections suggest a middle road between the two opposing
views. What the Crown promises is that the Indians shall have the
right to hunt and fish, subject to future regulation as opposed to
suppression. That is, the government reserves the power to regulate
the manner in which the rights are exercised, short of substantial
interference with the right itself. Of course, as a matter of
constitutional law, the Crown in Parliament remained free to impose
whatever statutes it wished, but, as a matter of treaty, the Crown
undertook to confine its interference to mere regulation.

If

this

interpretation is correct, the Constitution Act, 1982 reaffirms the treaty

promise and nullifies any legislation that crosses the line between
regulation and suppression.

Voluntary Extinguishment

A further question now arises. Can rights governed by sec. 35(1)
be modified or extinguished by the voluntary act of the native people
concerned without a constitutional amendment? To take a concrete
example, can aboriginal land rights be ceded to the Crown by
agreement coupled with ordinary legislation, or must an amendment
to the Constitution Act, 1982 be secured?
Forceful arguments can be made for the validity of voluntary
surrenders, at least in the case of aboriginal land rights. The
purpose of sec. 35(1), it can be said, is to insulate the rights of
aboriginal peoples from external threat, not to protect native peoples,
as it were, from themselves. There is no apparent reason why a total
of seven pro"vinces should have to sanction a land claims settlement,
as would be required under the amending formula in sec. 38.
Neither would such a requirement better protect the interests of the
native peoples themselves. It has always been considered possible
for a native people to cede aboriginal lands to the Crown by treaty,
and this historical practice is·reflected in the wording of sec. 35(1),
with its reference to both aboriginal and treaty rights.
More strikingly, both sec. 25 and sec. 35(3) refer to rights

acquired under future land claims agreements.67 These references
indicate that aboriginal land rights may be voluntarily exchanged for
treaty rights, and are not inherently inalienable. They also imply
that this exchange can take place without constitutional amendment.
Thus, sec. 35(3) provides in effect that where an aboriginal land
claim is settled, the agreement will be automatically entrenched in
the Constitution. But if rights conferred in return for aboriginal
lands are entrenched without constitutional amendment, it follows
that the surrender itself may take effect without such amendment.
It goes without saying that, for a surrender to be valid, it must be fully
voluntary, and that sec. 35(1) harbors rules ensuring this.

CONCLUSION

If we survey the results of our analysis, we are struck by the

potential of sec. 35(1) to provide solutions to a number of
longstanding problems and grievances. I have argued that the
section officially confirms the doctrine of aboriginal rights, whereby
the original rights of native American peoples are held to have
survived the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty, except insofar as
these were incompatible with the Crown's ultimate title, or were
subsequently modified by statute or other lawful acts. It also confirms
that aboriginal rights are legal rights, maintainable at law as against

the Crown and private parties. The section likewise recognizes
that rights conferred on native peoples in treaties signed by the
Crown are enforceable in the courts, regardless whether the
treaties were previously confirmed by statute. But the section
does not resurrect any aboriginal or treaty rights that had been
extinguished by lawful acts before the Constitutional Act, 1982
came into force. Rights covered by the section are shielded
against encroachment by ordinary statutes, except perhaps in
cases of emergency. Nevertheless, they can be supplemented or
diminished by voluntary agreement with the native peoples
concerned, without resort to constitutional amendment.
Beyond its practical effect, sec. 35(1) has an important symbolic
significance. The Constitution now clearly acknowledges the
historical role of native peoples in the making of Canada. That this
should rank as an achievement is itself a poignant comment on the
modern position of native peoples. It is now over two centuries
since

the Royal

Proclamation of

1763

was

issued.

The

bicentenary of that event passed twenty years ago without a trace
of public recognition in Canada. The Constitution Act, 1982 is the
measure of how far we have come in the past two decades. Canada
now seem poised to reclaim as its own the constitutional structures
that developed during almost five centuries of European relations

with native Canadian peoples.

ANNEX 168

Resolution to Amend the Constitution Act, 1982
Whereas the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that an amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor
General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by resolutions
of the Senate and House of Commons and resolutions of the legislative assemblies as provided for in section 38 thereof;
And Whereas the Constitution of Canada, reflecting the country and
Canadian society, continues to develop and strengthen the rights and freedoms that it guarantees;
And Whereas, after a gradual transition of Canada from colonial status
to the status of an independent and sovereign state, Canadians have, as of
April 17, 1982, full authority to amend their Constitution in Canada;
And Whereas historically and equitably it is fitting that the early exercise of that full authority should relate to the rights and freedoms of the
first inhabitants of Canada, the aboriginal peoples;
Now Therefore the (Senate) (House of Commons) (Legislative Assembly)
resolves that His Excellency the Governor General be authorized to issue a
proclamation under the Great Seal of Canada amending the Constitution of
Canada as follows:
PROCLAMATION AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA

1. Paragraph 25(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is repealed and the following substituted therefor.
"(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of
land claims agreements or may be so acquired."

Land claims
agreements

Aboriginal
and treaty
rights are
guaranteed
equally to
both sexes

2. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is amended
by adding thereto the following subsections:
"(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) ''treaty
rights" includes rights that now exist by way of land
claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection
(1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
3. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 35 thereof, the following
section:

Commitment
to
participation
in

constitutional
conference

"35.1 The government of Canada and the provincial
governments are committed to the principle that, before
any amendment is made to Class 24 of section 91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, to section 25 of this Act or to this
Part,
(a) a constitutional conference that includes in its

agenda an item relating to the proposed amendment, composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first ministers of the provinces, will
be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada;
and
(b ) the Prime Minister of Canada will invite repre-

sentatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to
participate in the discussions on that item."

4. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 37 thereof, the following Part:
"PART IV.l
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES
Constitutional
conferences

37.1 (1) In addition to the conference convened in
March 1983, at least two constitutional conferences composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first
ministers of the provinces shall be convened by the
Prime Minister of Canada, the first within three years
after April 17, 1982 and the second within five years after
that date.

Participation
of aboriginal
peoples

(2) Each conference convened under subsection (1)
shall have included in its agenda constitutional matters
that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada,
and the Prime Minister of Canada shall invite representatives of those peoples to participate in the discussions on those matters.

Participation
of territories

(3) The Prime Minister of Canada shall invite
elected representatives of the governments of the
Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories to participate in the discussions on any item on the agenda of
a conference convened under subsection (1) that, in the
opinion of the Prime Minister, directly affects the Yukon
Territory and the Northwest Territories.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed so as
to derogate from subsection 35(1)."

Subsection
35(1) not
a1fected

Repeal of
Part IV.1and
this section

5. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 54 thereof, the following
section:
"54.1 Part IV.1and this section are repealed on April
18, 1987."
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6. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto
the following section:
1161. A reference to the Constitution Act 1867 to 1982
shall be deemed to include a reference to the Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983."
7. This Proclamation may be cited as the Constitution
Amendment Proclamation, 1983.
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